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The United Kingdom is home to a vibrant technology sector, the 
innovations of which underpin many of the industries, products, and 
services that drive the European economy. Other industries in the UK, 
from the banking and financial sector to headquarters of global 
multinational companies, also depend on flows of data across national 
borders. The implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union are profoundly uncertain, and this uncertainty is particularly 
pronounced in the technology sector because of European regulation 
of data privacy and the flow of personal information. 
As we show here, however, the practical impact of Brexit on key 
concepts of data privacy is not likely to be substantial over the long 
run. Like parties to a divorce, the formal ties between the UK and the 
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EU will be unwound over the next two years. But former spouses 
often find that there is much to bind them even after the tie of 
marriage is broken, and we expect that this will be the case with the 
UK and the EU as well. Still, the relationship will never quite be the 
same. 
I. BACKGROUND: EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 
Under EU and UK law, data privacy is pervasively regulated. 
Unlike the legal structure in the United States, where sector-specific 
laws apply specific privacy rules to varying industry sectors, EU data 
protection law applies consistent principles across all types of 
personal information. The current law on privacy, the EU Data 
Protection Directive,1 dates from 1995 and was transposed into UK 
law through the Data Protection Act 1998. Under the Directive, which 
was one of the first binding international legal instruments 
establishing the law of data protection, processing of “personal data” 
is subject to key protections meant to protect the interests of the 
European data subject.2 
Key protections include a requirement that any processing be 
done pursuant to a “legal basis” – notably, with the consent of the 
subject, for the performance of a contract with the subject, to protect 
the subject’s interests, or for the “legitimate interests” of the 
processor. Personal data must be processed fairly; it can only be 
collected for a legitimate purpose; the amount of data cannot be 
excessive in light of the purpose for its collection; it must be accurate; 
and individuals have the right to access and correct it. “Sensitive” 
personal data, such as data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious beliefs, union membership, and data concerning 
sexual life, is subject to greater protection. Importantly, the personal 
data of EU subjects can only leave the boundaries of the EU if the 
receiving country has legal protections that are “adequate” in the eyes 
of the EU. 
                                                 
1. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, 1995 O.J. L 281/31. 
2. “Personal data,” under the Directive, means any information related to an identified or 
identifiable living person. “Processing” is defined as any operation that is performed upon 
personal data, whether by automatic or manual means. 
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The 1995 Directive was developed before the Internet was 
commercialized, and has struggled to remain relevant. In light of the 
many changes in the past 20 years, a new European regulation was 
crafted and will enter into force in May 2018. This new law, the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),3 is significantly more 
stringent and all-encompassing than the 1995 Directive. Among other 
things, the GDPR enhances existing legal requirements, creates a 
multitude of specific new rules, extends the territorial scope of EU 
data protection laws, establishes a new EU-wide privacy regulator, 
and sets out stiff penalties for organizations that fail to comply with 
its provisions. Importantly, the GDPR is a “regulation” and not a 
“directive.” Thus, it need not be transposed into national law by each 
Member State of the European Union, but rather will apply on its own 
terms once it comes into force. Assuming, then, that the UK does not 
formally leave the EU until mid-2019, the GDPR will be in force in 
the UK, as across the EU generally, prior to Brexit. 
II. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
To achieve Brexit, the UK, on March 29, 2017, issued formal 
notice to leave the Union in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty 
on the European Union (“TEU”). Triggering Article 50 TEU begins 
the two-year period (or longer if all the other EU Member States 
agree an extension) for the UK to negotiate the arrangements for its 
withdrawal (which may take into account the UK’s future relationship 
with the EU – see “A new marriage”). Much like most divorce 
proceedings, the negotiations will focus on what happens on day one 
of the divorce. Even more like divorce proceedings, the Article 50 
negotiations will likely focus on money, assets, shared collaborations, 
and who can live and stay with whom. For Brexit, this will mean 
addressing UK contributions to the EU budget, what to do with EU 
institutions physically located in the UK, shared industry sectors (e.g., 
nuclear), and the rights of EU citizens in the UK and vice versa. 
Importantly, during the Article 50 negotiation period the UK 
remains a full member of the EU and is subject to EU law in the usual 
way. For privacy this means that: 
                                                 
3. Council Regulation 2016/679/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. L 119/1. 
1556 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:5 
The EU GDPR will be directly applicable in the UK from May 
25, 2018. 
The Network and Information Systems Directive (“NIS 
Directive”)4 will require implementing into UK law via domestic 
legislation by May 9, 2018. 
Proposals for an e-Privacy Regulation,5 if finalized and 
applicable while the UK is still a member of the EU, will form part of 
UK law. 
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”), 
past and future, has primacy over UK law. 
III. D(IVORCE)- DAY 
The terms of the UK and EU marriage are enshrined in UK 
domestic legislation in the form of the European Communities Act 
1972 (“ECA”). The ECA defines the legal relationship between the 
UK and EU principally by asserting the supremacy of EU law. More 
specifically, the ECA creates the following norms: 
EU Treaties and Regulations apply in the UK without any 
further domestic implementation of those provisions by the UK into 
UK law.6 For example, the four freedoms of movement (goods, 
people, services, and capital) over EU borders, the rights to privacy 
and the protection of personal data (Article 7 and 8, respectively, of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), and the GDPR form part of 
the UK acquis of law without anything further required by the UK. 
EU Directives apply in the UK only by virtue of UK domestic 
legislation transposing them into UK law. The ECA obliges the UK to 
transpose these provisions and sets out the parameters and areas for 
discretion as to how the UK transposes and implements EU law 
enacted this way.7 For example, the EU Data Protection Directive was 
transposed into UK law via the Data Protection Act 1998. 
                                                 
4. Directive 2016/1148/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 
Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information 
Systems Across the Union, 2016 O.J. L 194/1. 
5. Proposal for a Regulation concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection 
of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, 
COM(2017) 10 Final.    
6. European Communities Act 1972, c. 68, § 2 (UK).  
7. Id. 
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International agreements concluded by the EU on behalf of its 
Member States apply to the UK as the UK is a Member State of the 
EU that has conferred the competence to conclude such arrangements 
with the EU. For example, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, the EU-U.S. 
“Umbrella” Agreement,8 and the EU-Canada Passenger Name 
Records Agreement9 all apply to the UK in its capacity as an EU 
Member State. 
In order to achieve “Brexit” the UK Government will need to 
unpack the cornerstone that governs and authorizes the UK’s 
membership and position in the EU. Simply, the UK will need to 
repeal the ECA. The UK Government has indicated that it will 
announce its intention to repeal the ECA via an Act of Parliament, 
referred to as the “Great Repeal Bill”.10 Repeal of the ECA means that 
all directly applicable provisions of EU law (e.g., EU Treaty 
provisions and Regulations) would automatically cease to apply in the 
UK. It also means that legislation based on the ECA (i.e., UK law that 
implements EU Directives) will cease to apply. If this course is 
undisturbed and let to run then on day one of Brexit, there will be a 
“cliff edge” which the UK regulatory framework will fall off. The EU 
acquis of law will disappear from the UK acquis. When one considers 
the volume of legislation and trade deals concluded by the EU in the 
history of the more than four decades of UK membership, this is not 
an insignificant corpus to bury. The ending of a long marriage can 
leave a gap that may take years to ever fill. 
Cognizant of this, the UK Government proposes to “save” and 
“convert” the EU acquis of law into UK law on day one of Brexit.11 
The Great Repeal Bill, as first published by the UK Government, 
proposes to both repeal the ECA and at the same time transpose into 
                                                 
8. Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the 
Protection of Personal Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and 
Prosecution of Criminal Offences, 2016 O.J. L 336/3, at 3-13. 
9. Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and 
processing of Passenger Name Record data. See Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
Conclusion of the Agreement Between Canada and the European Union on the Transfer and 
Processing of Passenger Name Record Data, COM (2013) 528 Final.  
10. The formal title of the “Great Repeal Bill” is the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 
which was published on July 13, 2017. 
11. See DEPARTMENT FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, LEGISLATING FOR THE 
UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (UK). See also 
DEPARTMENT FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM AND 
NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, § 1.1 (UK).   
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UK domestic law, wholesale, all EU law that applied in the UK prior 
to Brexit day. The rules will be the same but the legal bases for their 
application will derive, formally and legally speaking, not from the 
EU but, instead, from UK law. The proposed Great Repeal Bill has 
been set out but many legal and political hurdles and questions 
remain. But it can be said with some degree of confidence that the UK 
privacy framework as it exists on Brexit T-minus one day will look 
substantially similar to the UK privacy framework on Brexit day. The 
UK Government’s intention is for UK to have an “unprecedented … 
common regulatory framework” with the EU on Day One of Brexit. 
The foregoing may be true for EU law but what is not clear is 
what will happen to the UK’s position vis-à-vis agreements concluded 
by the EU on behalf of its Member States. On Brexit, the UK will 
cease to be a Member State and will, therefore, fall out of scope of 
these arrangements. The flow of personal data will be one such 
complication notwithstanding UK Government intentions to ensure 
that the flows are uninterrupted. 
IV. A NEW MARRIAGE? 
A. UK-EU Data Flows 
Under EU law (including the Data Protection Directive and, as 
of May 2018, the GDPR), data is free to flow throughout the EU so 
long as the data protection rules are complied with. The transfer of 
personal data out of the EU is restricted. Under current and future EU 
rules, data can be transferred to third countries only where (i) the 
European Commission has deemed that the recipient country’s data 
protection regime is “adequate” (which has been interpreted to mean 
must be “essentially equivalent” to the regime that exists under EU 
law12) or (ii) other safeguards (like “standard contractual clauses” or 
“binding corporate rules”) are deployed to effectively create 
adequacy. 
Post-Brexit, the UK will be one of these third countries and an 
adequacy determination (or something analogous) may form part of 
the negotiations. Implementation of the GDPR into UK law will go 
                                                 
12.  Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 2015, ¶¶ 73—74, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2015.398.01.0005.
01.ENG. 
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some way to the UK showing “adequacy” but it is unlikely to be the 
silver bullet. The EU will take a holistic approach to determining 
whether the UK’s privacy framework is adequate – the GDPR is but 
one yardstick the UK can be measured against. As was seen with the 
invalidation of the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor and the subsequent 
negotiations and challenges related to its successor, the EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield, attaining adequate status may not be straightforward. 
The UK may face specific difficulties with respect to its domestic 
data retention and surveillance law and practices (which the CJEU has 
declared incompatible with EU law) and as to the specific manner in 
which it implements the GDPR (for example, the UK, as a non-
member of the EU on Brexit, will have latitude to diverge from the 
rules and standards posited by the GDPR). 
The UK being deemed adequate by the European Commission 
(or securing an agreement of similar effect) will ensure that 
organizations can move personal data from the EU to the UK. 
Assuming the UK implements the GDPR into UK law in substantially 
the same content restrictions on data transfers into its domestic law, 
however, the UK will also need to deem the EU’s data protection 
regime “adequate” in order to allow data to move from the UK to the 
EU. 
B. UK-to-Third Country Data Flows 
Although the EU is the UK’s largest trading partner for data, the 
transfer of data between the UK and other countries outside the EU is 
also vital for the growth and competitiveness of the UK economy. 
The UK, as a member of the EU, benefits from the adequacy 
decisions the EU has in place for third countries such as Canada, 
Israel, Switzerland and the United States. The UK also benefits from 
arrangements that the EU has concluded with third countries that 
facilitate the sharing of law enforcement data (e.g., the EU-U.S. 
“Umbrella” Agreement) and other data sharing arrangements (e.g., 
the EU-Canada Passenger Name Record Agreement). On Brexit, the 
UK will no longer benefit from these arrangements. To ensure 
personal data in the UK can continue to be sent across the globe, the 
UK government will need to assess whether it can accede to these 
existing arrangements or conclude separate bilateral agreements. 
Maintaining and/or replicating these arrangements will be critical for 
data flows as well as for resolving the international legal conflicts that 
sometimes arise when companies honour requests for law 
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enforcement data. Note also that some countries have their own 
adequacy regimes; governments from those countries normally look 
to the EU’s recognition of adequacy as a guide for their own 
adequacy decisions. 
Another consideration for the UK is that the arrangements it puts 
in place with third countries may impact the deal the UK can 
conclude with the EU regarding data flows – in other words, a UK-
U.S. data flow deal that flew in the face of EU rules and standards 
could be a blocker to a UK-EU deal. 
C. Future Regulatory Regime 
It would be tempting to conclude that as a divorcé, the UK can 
play by its own rules with respect to privacy. That is true, strictly 
speaking at least. Post-Brexit, the UK can take its privacy laws in 
whichever direction it pleases, subject to its own domestic law 
limitations, which the UK Parliament is sovereign to amend at any 
time and which will be within the jurisdiction of the UK, rather than 
the EU courts. That said, the reality of the UK exercising this 
apparent unfettered freedom will be limited and shaped by the 
commitments it seeks and puts in place with the EU and other third 
countries. The other side of the negotiating table for data flows, a 
priority of the UK Government, will seek to secure something close to 
similarity (if not “essential equivalence”) in regulatory protections in 
UK law to that which exist in their own jurisdiction. Divergence too 
far one way or the other could jeopardize the UK’s ability to secure 
the free flow of data from the UK to other countries. If data is 
effectively localized in the UK or if data is effectively prevented from 
being transferred to the UK, this will not only undermine the UK 
Government’s aspirations for the UK to be at the forefront of the 
digital revolution but it will also undermine the cross-border 
functioning of UK companies and companies looking to do business 
in the UK. 
D. EU Jurisprudence 
Worthy of separate attention is the status of CJEU case law in 
the UK post-Brexit. 
In its White Paper on the Great Repeal Bill, the UK Government 
indicated that the Great Repeal Bill will bring an end to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK in a formal sense. In that sense, 
2017] BREXIT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY 1561 
UK courts will no longer be able to refer cases to the CJEU and nor 
will the CJEU be the ultimate arbiter on questions of UK law derived 
from the EU. As regards historic case law, and cognizant of the 
lacuna in jurisprudence of simply forgetting historical CJEU 
decisions, the UK Government proposes to enshrine historic CJEU 
case law with the “same binding, or precedent, status” in UK courts 
as if they were UK Supreme Court decisions. Tying historic CJEU 
jurisprudence to domestic jurisprudence means that there will can be 
some continued certainty in the scope and shape of rights and 
obligations in UK law that originally derived from EU law (e.g. on 
the scope of the so-called “right to be forgotten,”13 specific 
application of the right to privacy, or what makes a third country 
“adequate” for data protection purposes14). 
That said, UK courts and UK Parliament may, and indeed are 
entitled to, deviate from historic CJEU case law over time “when it 
appears right to do so” and it is quite probably there will be 
discrepancies in how UK courts and the CJEU interpret and apply 
similarly-phrased provisions of law. Moreover, post-Brexit CJEU 
decisions and interpretations will have no formal binding role in the 
UK courts. The exact weight that will be given by UK courts to future 
CJEU decisions on similarly-scoped rights and obligations to those 
that exist in UK law remains a great unknown, however. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In matters of law and policy, the letter of the law seldom tells the 
entire story. Expectations and norms are built up around legal 
structures over years of operation, and economies create their own 
demands and traditions. In the case of privacy in the EU, the need to 
ensure consistent data flows across borders is a powerful force. This 
is particularly true in the United Kingdom, which is a center of 
commerce and the technology industry for not only Europe but the 
world. Brexit will, to be sure, change the United Kingdom in many 
ways. But the remarkable force exerted by flows of data will ensure 
that privacy laws in the EU and the UK remain relatively consistent 
for both parties even after their divorce. 
                                                 
13. Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, 2014, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131&from=EN. 
14. Schrems, C-362/14.  
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